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a was a figure of singular importance, not only religiously, but also for
social and political reasons, for middle-class Bengal in the nineteenth century. Ayon
Maharaj refers to him as Sri Ramakrishna (somewhat analogous to calling Thomas
Aquinas, Saint Thomas) throughout his book, Infinite Paths to Infinite Reality: Sri
Ramakrishna and Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion (2018; henceforth, IPIR).
His charisma as a holy man and mystic attracted many followers, among others a
group of young men, notably Svāmı̄ Vivekānanda, who went on to play a key role in
the development of a form of Hinduism with a social message that sought to come
to terms with modernity in dialogue with Western influences. His legacy lives on
through the Ramakrishna Mission with its headquarters at the Belur Math in West
Bengal and its centers of social and educational mission throughout India and in






a deserves serious study.
Indeed, many books have been written on the mystic and holy man, but very few






a as a thinker. It is the latter task that Maharaj






a’s teachings and narrations of his experiences,
perceived as authoritatively recorded in the Śrīśrīrāmakṛṣṇakathāmṛta (Gupta
1974), which we shall refer to, in abbreviated form, as the Kathāmṛta, are often
described as “philosophical” by Maharaj who seems to regard his own task as no
more than spelling out this intellectual content by engaging with a variety of Hindu
and Western thinkers.
Under the comprehensive chapter headings given, Maharaj writes with great
clarity, force, and incisiveness, unfolding a philosophical standpoint that calls for
serious consideration. But if there is a philosopher to be found, it is to Maharaj that
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a the philosopher. Rather, he comes across as a highly perceptive observer
of human nature, kindly and exceptional in that he is recorded as having undergone
a range of extraordinary para-empirical (“mystical”) experiences. From the quoted






a in homely but assertive
fashion, with hardly any attempt to systematize them or make them rationally
coherent—the task, it would be generally agreed, that falls to the philosopher. It is
Maharaj who pursues this aim. And so the question arises: How does Maharaj set






a’s views emerge as philosophically
cogent, tractable, and, indeed, where applicable, morally acceptable?
Maharaj produces a very interesting and intellectually weighty synthesis—but
there are problems nonetheless, both philosophical and moral. Whether these are to
be attributed to Maharaj’s guru (Maharaj is described in this book as an ordained
brahmacārin, or celibate of the Ramakrishna Order) or to Maharaj himself is, based
on the evidence given, a conundrum I could not resolve. But let us review some of
the philosophical issues that arise.
Maharaj says: “I characterize Sri Ramakrishna’s philosophy as ‘Vijñāna
Vedānta,’ a nonsectarian philosophy—rooted in the mystical experience of what
he calls vijñāna—that accommodates and harmonizes various apparently conflicting
religious faiths, sectarian philosophies, and spiritual disciplines” (IPIR 16). An
ambitious claim! Under the various chapter headings covering “Divine Infinitude”
and the “Overcoming of Conceptual Idolatry,” religious pluralism, mystical
experience, and the problem of evil, we have in the quotation above Maharaj’s
grand synthetic plan. En passant, various thinkers and standpoints are engaged with:
Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Śrı̄ Aurobindo, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Jehangir Chubb,
Evan Fales, Jerome Gellman, Benedikt Paul Göcke, John Hick, Immanuel Kant,
Jean-Luc Marion, Robert Oakes, Duns Scotus, Ninian Smart, W. T. Stace, Michael
Stoeber, Richard Swinburne, Teresa of Ávila, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, perennialist
and constructivist views of mysticism, skeptical theism, saint-/soul-making
theodicies, and quite a few others besides.






a’s experience of vijñāna on which he






a’s viewpoint? He affirms that vijñāna is
“intimate knowledge”—“a vaster, richer, and more intimate realization of God as
the Infinite Reality that is both personal and impersonal, with and without form,
immanent in the universe and beyond it” (16; emphasis added). “Sri Ramakrishna,”
Maharaj continues, “grants equal ontological status to the impersonal and personal
aspects of the Infinite Reality” (61; emphasis in the original). Maharaj justifies his
claim about this comprehensive experience by arguing that the Infinite Reality






a mystically can be all these things precisely
because it is infinite. Citing Göcke’s work, he argues that the Infinite/God
transcends the law of contradiction. Other mystics who claim to experience one or







has experienced these otherwise contradictory-seeming properties in the same
Reality, is correct. For Maharaj, the law of contradiction becomes a convenient
fiction with reference to this Reality.
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experienced a Supreme Being, let alone a Supreme Being that in itself harmonizes
what we would regard as contradictory qualities, an experience which in Maharaj’s
words “grants equal ontological status to the impersonal and personal aspects of the







alleged experience of this Reality, I think what Maharaj wants to be asking is: Does
this experience grant equal epistemological status to these apparently contradictory
qualities, and if it does, what are the implications for its veridicality? Two or more
qualities can have equal ontological status, but this does not necessarily imply that
they have equal epistemological status for their experiencer (one or more may be
experienced as illusory or less real), and it is the epistemological point, it seems,
that Maharaj seeks to establish. This piggy-back question, with its implications, is
not explicitly taken up.







claim that his (vijñāna) experience of the Infinite Reality is “self-authenticating.”1 I
have read this section carefully twice: it does no more than argue that this is a






a’s part. But even if this claim were to be reckoned as
rational—and I am not convinced that it can be (part of Maharaj’s argument is that
Teresa of Ávila insists that such self-authenticating experience “itself involves an
epistemically unique feeling of ‘certitude’—granted to the mystic by God Himself
—which guarantees the veridicality of her experience”; IPIR 206; underline
emphasis added)—it still remains a claim, a claim whose certainty is explained as
one of the “secrets of God’s omnipotence” (IPIR 206, citing Teresa herself in








a’s experiencing mind is, presumably, finite, how can we be sure
that a finite mind has really experienced Infinite Reality and not some very great and
grand and mighty, but still finite, entity (in which case, the law of contradiction
would, no doubt, apply), or perhaps some delusion or flight of the imagination?
After all, the experiencer by definition occupies a different order of being from the
Experienced. Such a claim may well be spiritually impressive, but it has no
philosophical legs.
The argument is not helped by Maharaj tending to slide from claim to assertion.






a “claimed to have realized different forms and
aspects of one and the same Infinite Reality by means of…diverse paths” (IPIR 144;
emphasis added). Then, soon after, we are informed (there is an almost







experienced multiple aspects of God, occupies a unique epistemic vantage point
from which he is able to harmonize conflicting religious truth-claims about the
nature of the ultimate reality” (IPIR 144; underline emphasis added). The slide from
claim to assertion elides the important philosophical issue we have mentioned.
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A caveat here: In footnote 18 on page 17 of IPIR, Maharaj writes:
When I refer to the mystical experiences Sri Ramakrishna claimed to have
had, I often leave out qualifying phrases such as “claimed to have” or
“reportedly.” However, it should be kept in mind throughout this book that
these qualifying phrases are always implied. I am not dogmatically asserting
the veridicality of Sri Ramakrishna’s reported mystical experiences.
We have reference here to a very important omission in what is an extraordinary
footnote—which indeed fails to meet our criticism. Look again at the texts I have







“claimed to have realized different forms and aspects,” etc. This is clear: it is a
claim. But in the succeeding text, Maharaj says, “Ramakrishna…who has
experienced multiple aspects of God, occupies [= does occupy] a unique epistemic
vantage point,” etc. Here Maharaj is making an assertion. How is the reader to
follow the footnote and insert the supposedly understood “claimed” in the assertion?







a does occupy a unique vantage point from which he is able
to harmonize conflicting religious truth-claims about the nature of the ultimate
reality. For such a statement is not equivalent to a claim. Maharaj has indeed shifted
from claim to assertion. Further, it is not for the reader to strive to clarify or make
good the argument. This is the author’s job. If Maharaj states clearly in the premise
that a claim is being made, he must state equally clearly in the conclusion that this is
still a claim. But to do this here would change the sense of the conclusion that
Maharaj (seemingly) wants to affirm. For both reasons then, the criticism stands.






a’s vijñāna experience as comprehensive as all













a is quoted as saying that
the Buddha “was not an atheist. He simply could not express the Reality in words.…
By meditating on one’s own bodha svarūpa [Maharaj adds in square brackets:
‘one’s true nature as Pure Consciousness’], one becomes that bodha svarūpa.…”
(IPIR 111–12; emphasis in the original). Maharaj concludes: “Sri Ramakrishna
explains the Buddha’s enlightenment in Advaitic terms as the realization of his own
true Self, which is of the nature of Pure Consciousness.…Sri Ramakrishna implies
that what the Buddha called ‘nibbāna’ is a negative term denoting the realization of
the ineffable Ātman” (IPIR 112). This is not going to please many Theravāda
Buddhists (not to mention Mahāyānists) who, theoretically at least, do not subscribe
to the existence of some Advaitic Absolute as defining the experience/state of







pronouncement. So he says: “Numerous scholars have argued that the Buddha’s
teaching of anattā (‘nonself’; Sanskrit, anātman) was meant to deny the reality of
the empirical-personal self rather than of the impersonal Vedāntic Ātman” (IPIR
112).
This too is an extraordinary statement to make. To justify it, in a footnote
Maharaj references a number of scholars supposedly endorsing his claim. I could
not check them all (IPIR 112fn48). But I did check one, namely, “Edward Conze,
Buddhist Thought in India (1962), 129–34.” The extract referred to in the footnote is
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part of a section in which Conze discusses what he calls the “Personalists” in
Buddhism, or the pudgalavādins (1962: 122–23), who for a start he describes from
the Buddhist standpoint as “‘outsiders in our midst,’ or ‘heretics’ as we would put
it” (IPIR 123). This is hardly a good start from the viewpoint of Maharaj’s






a aright, then according to Conze,
his guru is endorsing what heretical Buddhists would say! At most, suggests Conze
in the extract referred to by Maharaj, “the helpless animosity they [the Personalists]
aroused among their brethren, seem[s] to suggest that they fulfilled a useful
function” (1962: 129), in that, as the Buddhist thinker Candrakı̄rti maintained,
“under certain circumstances it may be useful to teach that there is a self” (IPIR 130;
emphasis added). This is miles away from the Buddhists in general implicitly
affirming that nibbāna points to the existence of a Vedāntic (Advaitic) Ātman, as
Maharaj would have it. It is “remarkable” Conze goes on to say, “that there is not
one canonical passage in which the existence of such a true Self is ever clearly
stated. To some extent it may be that the Pudgalavādin theory was so universally
rejected because it was based on a fundamental misconception of the purpose and
function of Buddhist philosophy” (1962: 131; emphasis added).
Conze writes with great subtlety about how the various Buddhist traditions, both
Theravāda and Mahāyāna, grappled with the idea of having to eliminate, in
accordance with orthodox teaching, the natural urge to hold on to some continuous
or permanent, usually individual, person or self, but, as our quotations from Conze
indicate, he is clear that affirming non-self was the orthodox aim. To say, then, that
Conze argues here that the Buddha’s teaching of non-self “was meant to deny the
reality of the empirical-personal self rather than of the impersonal Vedāntic
Ātman,” to quote Maharaj again, makes a travesty of the thrust of Conze’s
discussion. To pursue this matter would be fruitless. The point is not whether Conze
provides a correct understanding of Buddhist thought here. The point is that he







a. If this is the case for one adduced reference, what might it be for the
others?














comes out on top. The views of John Hick, Ron Neufeldt, Ninian Smart, and others






a’s, acknowledged as “enriching” or






a’s position, but invariably rejected as






a always reign supreme—in the
cogency of every view, the insight of every argument, the comprehensiveness of
every stance? It is here that philosophy gives way to a kind of theological reverence.
I am happy to make room for faith, but faith is not philosophy.







“the problem of evil” (see especially Part Four). As the reader will be aware, this is







a’s theodicy triumphs over every other. But it is here that I find a
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hard theological determinist, since he maintains that theological determinism
is incompatible with free will. Free will, according to Sri Ramakrishna, is
actually a “false appearance.”…Sri Ramakrishna maintains that God is the
ultimate causal source of all our beliefs and desires.…According to Sri
Ramakrishna, God Himself, in His infinite wisdom, has endowed ordinary
unenlightened people with the illusion of free will; otherwise, they would have














a, “God determines everything we do” (IPIR 294; emphasis
added).
Morally, there is a problem here. For whatever benign reason, we have a
deceiving God—a sower of confusion—who deludes us into thinking that we are
free and who yet allows the law of karma to operate by bestowing retribution and
reward, albeit with a view to “saint-making.” If we are not free to act as we do, why
are we allowed to suffer the recompense of karma from life to life? On the other
hand, how can we become truly saintly when there is no freedom of action? In this
context, how can we “all look forward to the infinite reward of eternal salvation”
(IPIR 297; emphasis added)? This is to turn the sense of such words on its head.
Maharaj affirms,
Since Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy presupposes the doctrines of
karma and rebirth, it [saint-making] is a live possibility even in the cases of
Bambi [the baby deer]....and [Genghis] Khan’s victims. Sri Ramakrishna
would view their suffering as the karmic consequence of their own past actions
in that life or in a previous life” (IPIR 290; emphasis in the original).
This observation would also apply, no doubt, in the case of the victims of the
Holocaust, including the children. But how could they be responsible for the horrors
they suffered and how could this unconscionable experience contribute to their
saint-making, even if the concept of past and future lives were to come into play?
Further, would this not encourage the perpetrators of these crimes to say: “Don’t
look at us! We’re but the instruments of a just karma!” Morally, I find all this utterly
objectionable.
The thing is that it is not even philosophically necessary for Maharaj to impute






a’s belief in the law of karma. For many Hindu
thinkers who accept karma have pointed out that karmic consequences are
imputable to the series of transient selves that come into being in conjunction with
an impersonal karma-storing subtle body (liṅga śarīra) specific to each series that is
itself particularly associated with an impervious metaphysical Self (whether this be






a’s case the [one] absolute Ātman). So, it would not be
you—this particular transient personality—that performed the actions of the past on
which karmic consequences now fall; it would be some other (past) transient self or
selves in the series to which you happen to belong. This raises other moral
questions, to be sure, but at least it absolves individuals in the here and now from
being subjected to such statements as: “their suffering [is] the karmic consequence
of their own past actions in…[this] life or in a previous one” (IPIR 290; emphasis
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added). In terms of personal identity, these past actions belong to other selves. With
horrors like the Holocaust in mind, this would allow the innocent to remain truly







a’s alleged belief in moral determinism is a separate problem). But
Maharaj nowhere goes into the question of the metaphysics of the empirical self in
Hindu thought and its consequences for belief in karma and saint-making with







On a lesser scale, perhaps one should point out that the concepts of “avatāra”
and “incarnation” have been conflated2 and that “refute,” which the Oxford English
Dictionary assures us means “prove to be wrong,” is misused for “repudiate” (“deny
the truth or validity of”), while the Index remains incomplete.
But on the larger issues, this is a richly thought-provoking work, written with a
philosophical acumen that demands response and calls for appreciation and further







words, Maharaj’s is a landmark attempt, giving its subject the serious intellectual
attention it deserves, which will encourage, I hope, similar studies on what remains
a topic of global historical importance.
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